By Pierre Cardaliaguet; Ross Cressman (eds.)
Pt. 1. Evolutionary video games -- a few Generalizations of a Mutual Mate selection challenge with Age personal tastes / David M. Ramsey -- Signalling Victory to make sure Dominance: a continual version / Mike Mesterton-Gibbons and Tom N. Sherratt -- Evolutionary video games for a number of entry regulate / Quanyan Zhu, Hamidou Tembine and Tamer Başar -- sign up for Forces or Cheat: Evolutionary research of a Consumer-Resource process / Andrei R. Akhmetzhanov, Frédéric Grognard, Ludovic Mailleret and Pierre Bernhard. Pt. 2. Dynamic and Differential video games: Theoretical advancements -- robust Strategic help of Cooperative strategies in Differential video games / Sergey Chistyakov and Leon Petrosyan -- Characterization of suggestions Nash Equilibrium for Differential video games / Yurii Averboukh -- Nash Equilibrium Payoffs in combined recommendations / Anne Souquière -- A Penalty technique technique for Open-Loop Variational video games with Equality Constraints / Dean A. Carlson and George Leitmann -- Nash Equilibrium looking for Dynamic platforms with Non-quadratic Payoffs / Paul Frihauf, Miroslav Krstic and Tamer Başar -- A Uniform Tauberian Theorem in optimum keep watch over / Miquel Oliu-Barton and Guillaume Vigeral -- E-Equilibria for Multicriteria video games / Lucia Pusillo and Stef Tijs -- suggest box video games with a Quadratic Hamiltonian: A optimistic Scheme / Olivier Guéant. Pt. three. Pursuit-evasion video games and seek video games -- Differential Game-Theoretic method of a Spatial Jamming challenge / Sourabh Bhattacharya and Tamer Başar -- research of Linear video game with Pursuers and One Evader: varied energy of Pursuers / Sergey A. Ganebny, Sergey S. Kumkov, Stéphane Le Ménec and Valerii S. Patsko -- Salvo greater No get away region / Stéphane Le Ménec -- a style of fixing Differential video games below Integrally restricted Controls / Aleksandr A. Belousov, Aleksander G. Chentsov and Arkadii A. Chikrii -- Anglers' Fishing challenge / Anna Karpowicz and Krzysztof Szajowski -- A Nonzero-Sum seek online game with aggressive Searchers and a objective / Ryusuke Hohzaki. Pt. four. functions of dynamic video games -- ads and cost to maintain the emblem price in a Licensing agreement / Alessandra Buratto -- Cost-Revenue Sharing in a Closed-Loop offer Chain / Pietro De Giovanni and Georges Zaccour
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Extra resources for Advances in dynamic games : theory, applications, and numerical methods for differential and stochastic games
This behavior is illustrated in Fig. 2 in the limit as ζ → 1 from above, so that the second critical value recedes towards infinity. 32 M. N. Sherratt z MOTIVATION FOR LOSER TO DISPLAY Fig. 1 ESS regions in the ρ − ζ plane for fixed values of T /μ , hence fixed values of α = 1/(1 − e−T /μ ). 13) holds. 1 0 0 3 6 9 Tm CONTEST LENGTH Fig. 2 Scaled intensity of winner’s victory display as a function of scaled contest length for various values of the parameter ρ = (1 − b)/γw (assumed to exceed 1) in the limit as ζ → 1 from above, where ζ = b/γl In general, however, both critical values are finite.
2) (1 − b)q(u1, v2 ) − bq(v1, u2 ) − cw (u1 ) − cl (u2 ) + b. 2 We need to place conditions on the functions cw , cl and q. First, for cw and cl , it seems reasonable to suppose that cw (0) = 0, cw (s) > 0, cw (s) ≥ 0 (as in ) and cl (0) = 0, cl (s) > 0, cl (s) ≥ 0. 4) throughout, where θ (> 0) has the dimensions of INTENSITY−1 , so that γw (> 0) and γl (> 0) are dimensionless measures of the marginal cost of displaying for a winner and a loser, respectively. Second, for q, the following seem reasonable: q(∞, l) = 1 for any finite l, and q(w, l) = δ for all w ≤ l where δ is the base probability that winning will lead to dominance—a winner cannot increase its chance of converting its win into dominance unless it is displaying with at least as strong an intensity as the loser.
R. Soc. Lond. B 277, 2571–2575 (2010) 17. : Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1982) 18. : Evolutionary game theory and adaptive dynamics of continuous traits. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 38, 403–435 (2007) 19. : On the evolution of pure winner and loser effects: a game-theoretic model. Bull. Math. Biol. 61, 1151–1186 (1999) 20. : Victory displays: a game-theoretic analysis. Behav. Ecol. 17, 597–605 (2006) 21. : What sets the odds of winning and losing? Trends Ecol.
Advances in dynamic games : theory, applications, and numerical methods for differential and stochastic games by Pierre Cardaliaguet; Ross Cressman (eds.)